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  There was an emergence of “lowest-low fertility” defined as having TFR (Total 
Fertility Rate) of 1.3 or less in Europe in the 1990s (Kohler et al., 2002).  After the 
turn of century, lowest-low fertility started spreading in Eastern Asia.  Japan’s TFR 
of 1.26 in 2005 is lower than most European countries, although is higher than the 
Republic of Korea (1.08) and Taiwan (1.12).     
  The emergence of lowest-low fertility was accompanied by various reversals in 
the relation with socioeconomic determinants at the aggregate level.  Unlike in the 
1970s, low fertility countries of today are characterized by low female labor force 
participation, robust marriage institution, and strong family ties.  Thus, it is not the 
change in family values toward individualization and secularization as emphasized in 
the second demographic transition theory (van de Kaa, 1984) that is responsible for 
lowest-low fertility.    Rather, we should focus on the disharmony between the changing 
socioeconomic determinants of fertility and unchanging family values in lowest-low 
fertility countries. 
  It is thought that extremely low fertility results in rapid population aging, 
decline in working age population, and a sharp increase in the dependency ratio.  
Such demographic changes would cause many serious problems including a crisis of 
public pension system, labor shortages, economic recession, and loss of societal vitality.   
The Japanese government was shocked with the TFR of 1.57 in 1989 and launched a 
variety of pronatal policy measures.    However, these policy interventions have not yet 
succeeded in preventing fertility decline. 
  This paper firstly examines the recent fertility decline and discusses its 
determinants.  After considering the effect of tempo distortion, a decomposition of 
fertility decline to nuptiality and marital fertility will be attempted.    It will be shown 
that demands for spouse and children are not declining rapidly and are not at the 
lowest-low level.    Thus, recent fertility decline should be explained not from changing 
family values but from obstacles to fulfill the demand.    Such obstacles as direct cost of 
children, difficulty for occupational achievement for youth and opportunity cost 
                                                  
1  National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Tokyo, Japan.  2
accompanied by female labor force participation are examined. 
  After describing the history of governmental intervention to promote fertility 
in Japan, the effects of policy measures such as child allowance, childcare leave, and 
daycare service will be examined.  Analyses in Japanese literatures imply that those 
measures are not as effective as expected.    Then, it will be shown that a large part of 
the differences between moderately low and lowest-low fertility are attributed to direct 
effects of cultural features, not to governmental efforts.    A cultural deterministic view 
on fertility points out the cultural features in moderately low fertility countries that 
prevented fertility from declining to the lowest-low level.    It will be shown that these 
cultural differences are beyond the family policy, and that a governmental intervention 
cannot induce continuous fertility recovery to the moderately low level. 
 
1. Recent Fertility Decline in Japan 
 
1-1. Cohort Fertility 
 The  Complete 
Fertility Rate (CFR) of a real 
cohort is a more desirable 
measure than the TFR, 
because the latter suffers 
from tempo distortion and the 
parity composition effect 
(Ortega and Kohler, 2002).   
The problem is that the CFR 
cannot be determined until 
the cohort completes its 
reproduction.  However, the 
CFR of cohorts in their forties 
is predictable because only a 
small number of births will be added to the current level.  Figure 1 shows the 
cumulative fertility relative to that of the 1950 cohort, using the scheme by Frejka and 
Calot (2001).  Although the 1955 cohort was behind its predecessor in the early 
twenties, it succeeded in catch up and will fulfill a near replacement level.    However, 
a significant decline in the CFR for cohorts born after 1960 seems to be inevitable.  
The cumulative fertility of the 1960 cohort is 1.84 at age 43 and will not reach 1.9 
eventually.  Though it is difficult to predict the CFR for cohorts born after 1965, the 
postponement in the early twenties seems too serious to be compensated later.    Thus, 
the CFR of younger cohorts in Japan can be as low as 1.6, which is predicted for Italian 
cohorts (Frejka and Calot, 2001, p. 112; van Imhoff, 2001, p. 55). 
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1-2. Period Fertility 
  In many countries with very low fertility, there is a secular trend of 
postponement of childbearing.    This is also the case in Japan.    Figure 2 presents the 
mean ages at childbearing by birth order since 1984.2    The mean age at all births rose 
from 28.1 in 1984 to 29.6 in 1997.  Then, the change stagnated toward the turn of 
century.  However, the delay was accelerated again and the mean age rose to 29.9 in 
2004.  This reacceleration was caused by the delay in first birth, which age jumped 
from 28.0 in 2001 to 28.5 in 2004. 
  Such a postponement 
in childbearing causes “tempo 
distortion” that the TFR is 
depressed to an undesirably 
low level.  Bongaarts and 
Feeney (1998) proposed a 
measure to remove tempo 
distortion from the TFR.   
Their ATFR (Adjusted Total 
Fertility Rate) is a 
hypothetical TFR that would 
materialize if there were no 
delay in childbearing.     
  Another deficiency of 
the TFR is that it is based on 
“incidence rates” that do not 
refer to the population at risk.   
The denominator of incidence 
rate is female population by 
age without  considering 
parity.  On the other hand, 
the theoretically desirable 
occurrence / exposure ratio is 
called “intensity” of birth 
(Ortega and Kohler, 2002, p. 
4) and given as the ratio of 
age-parity specific births to 
age-parity specific female population.  While incidence rates are easily obtained, 
intensities are more difficult especially in Japan where the census does not include a 
question on children ever born.  Here, parity distributions are estimated by tracing 
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the fertility behavior of each cohort.  Once a set of intensities in a given year is 
obtained, a multi state life table that depicts the parity progression of a hypothetical 
cohort can be created.    Then, one can calculate the mean number of children using the 
eventual parity distribution in this life table.  Here, such a measure of fertility is 
called PAP (Period Average Parity)3  and compared with the TFR and the ATFR. 
  Figure 3 shows these three indices of fertility.  The difference between the 
TFR and PAP, which is the parity distribution effect without tempo adjustment, is very 
small in Japan.  While the proportions of parity zero and one are rapidly increasing, 
such a change does not result in a deceptive fall in the TFR.  The difference between 
the TFR and ATFR is the tempo distortion based on incidence rates.  The distortion 
continuously diminished by 2001 and then expanded again due to the reacceleration in 
postponement.  
 
2. Determinants of Lowest-Low Fertility in Japan 
 
2-1. Nuptiality 
  Extramarital births are rare in Japan, accounting for only 1.99% of all births 
in 2004.  Thus, a fall of nuptiality directly results in a fall of fertility.  Figure 4 
compares the TFR and female TFMR (Total First Marriage Rate).  The TMFR is an 
estimate of the proportion ever married at age 50 of a hypothetical cohort without 
death.  This proportion dropped more moderately than the TFR.  While the TFR fell 
by 28.7% between 1984 and 2004, TFMR of Japanese women fell only by 16.2%. 
  Figure 5 presents female mean age at first marriage and at first childbearing.   
As mentioned above, the delay in first birth stagnated around 2000 and then 
accelerated again.  This 
change was not wholly 
attributable to the change 
in marriage timing but 
there was a change in 
fertility behavior of newly 
wed couples.  In addition 
to the fall in quantum and 
delay in timing of first 
marriage, the crude divorce 
rate rose from 1.28 per 
thousand in 1990 to 2.15 
per thousand in 2004. 
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closely related measure. 
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  The contribution of nuptiality to fertility was conducted using AMFRs 
(Age-specific Marital Fertility Rates) until the mid 1990s in Japan (Atoh, 1992, p. 51; 
Kono, 1995, pp. 67-71; Tsuya and Mason, 1995, pp. 147-148; NIPSSR, 1997, p.10).  
Though such analyses always 
say that the recent fertility 
decline in Japan was caused 
solely by the nuptiality decline, 
the result is not reliable because 
of the deficiencies in AMFRs 
(Hirosima, 2001; Suzuki, 2004).  
More sophisticated methods 
have been showing very 
different results. Hirosima 
(1999) used the proportion of 
eventually married women and 
the complete average number of 
children among married women to decompose the effects of nuptiality and marital 
fertility.  For the TFR decline between 1974 and 1997 (from 2.05 to 1.39), 24.3% was 
attributed to the quantum of marriage, 36.5% to the quantum of marital fertility, and 
the remaining 39.4% to tempo distortion.  Hirosima (2000) attempted to decompose 
the effect of tempo distortion on marriage and childbearing.  His result shows that 
quantum and tempo of marriage account for approximately 70% of the TFR decline 
between 1970 and 2000 (from 2.138 to 1.386), while those of marital fertility explains 
30%.  Ogawa (1998) decomposed the fertility decline between 1990 and 1995 
measured with parity progression ratios and found that a little less than 40% is 
explained by nuptiality decline.  Kaneko (2004) adjusted AMFR by shifting 
age-specific fertility rates f(x) in accordance with the delay in marriage.    He concluded 
that 73.7% of the TFR decline between 1980 and 2000 was caused by nuptiality decline.   
Iwasawa (2002) introduced the eventual average number of children by age at 
marriage to decompose the decline in cohort cumulative fertility.  Converting the 
estimated cohort fertility to period fertility, she had a similar result as Hirosima 
(2000), i.e. that approximately 70% of the TFR decline between 1970 and 2000 was due 
to nuptiality decline.  Suzuki (2005) applied the simplified method of Iwasawa to 
Japan and Korea, assuming that marital fertility does not depends on the age at 
marriage but solely on the marriage duration.    The result showed that 37% of the TFR 
decline between 1990 and 2002 in Japan (from 1.54 to 1.32) was explained by 
nuptiality decline. 
  As a whole, nuptiality decline explains between 35% and 75% of the TFR 
decline, depending on the period in question.  Thus, it is safe to say that both 
nuptiality and marital fertility have contributed to the recent fertility decline in Japan, 
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and their relative importance varies over time. 
 
2-2. Proximate Determinants 
  Since marriage does not explain the fertility decline in its entirety, there 
should be proximate determinants (Bongaarts, 1978) that caused a significant fall in 
marital fertility.  However, neither contraception nor induced abortion is responsible 
for it.  As shown in Figure 6, the proportion of currently married women practicing 
contraception was 55.9% in 2000 and was lower than in the early 1990s.  This 
considerably low level of contraception practice is attributed to a heavy bias in favor of 
male methods (Atoh, 2000, p. 108).  Condom accounted for 75.3% of all contraceptive 
methods (multiple answers) in 2000, while the pill and IUD accounted for only 4.2%.  
It was as late as in 1999 that the low dose pill was legalized in Japan.    Because there 
were worries about an expansion of STDs, access to the low dose pill is still limited and 
a prescription is required.  As a result, the practice of contraception increased only 
slightly after the permission. 
  There is no 
evidence of an increasing 
number of unwanted 
pregnancies.  As shown in 
Figure 6, the ratio of 
abortions to births dropped 
in the early 1990s and 
sustained a low level under 
30%.  In 2004, there were 
301,673 cases of induced 
abortion operations and the 
ratio to births was 27.2%.  
This means that, in Japan, 
approximately two in nine 
pregnancies end in abortion.    However, the trend does not match the assessed decline 
in marital fertility. 
  As expected, the frequency of miscarriages has been declining.  There were 
34,365 still births in 2004 and the ratio to live births was 3.1%.  It was significantly 
lower than the 4.9% in 1984 and 4.4% in 1990.    It is said that many mothers in Japan 
have stopped breastfeeding by 1.5 years after the birth.  Thus, neither intrauterine 
mortality nor postpartum amenorrhea seems to have contributed to the recent fertility 
decline. 
  The remaining proximate determinants are frequency of intercourse and 
sterility.  There is no time series data on coital frequency or infecundity of married 
couples in Japan.  It might be possible to assert that sexless couples are increasing 
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due to the long working hours or strengthened mother-child ties.  It might also be 
possible to hypothesize an increase in infecundity due to the rising age at marriage, 
environmental hormones, and sexually transmitted diseases (Semba, 2002).    However, 
quantitative evaluations of such hypotheses will be difficult due to the lack of 
necessary data. 
 
2-3. Demands for Spouse and Children 
 An  important 
question on the recent 
nuptiality and fertility 
decline is whether it is a 
result of intentional 
behaviors.  The second 
demographic transition 
theory (van de Kaa, 1987) 
emphasizes the role of value 
changes such as 
individualization and 
secularization.  We can 
imagine a more radical 
value change toward an 
absolute individualism that 
refuses spouse or any form 
of partnership.  However, 
this is not the case in Japan.   
Figure 7 shows the 
proportion of unmarried 
males and females 
responding “I won’t marry 
forever”.  Although  there  is 
a continuous increase in the 
proportion of single people 
rejecting marriage, only 
7.1% of men and 5.6% of 
women answered in 2005 that they won’t marry forever.    Majority of men and women 
still hold the demand for spouse. 
  Figure 8 depicts changes in the ideal and the expected number of children of 
Japanese wives younger than age 50.  The ideal number of children is the answer to 
“how many children do you think to be ideal for you and your husband?”.  The 
expected number of children is the number that the couple already has plus the answer 
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to “how many children do you and your husband plan to have in the future?”.  
Although there was a slight decrease in demand for children, the figures are still 
higher than two.  In the 2005 survey, the ideal number was 2.48 and the expected 
number was 2.11.    Both were well above the replacement level. 
  After all, it is clear that lowest-low fertility in today’s Japan is not due to 
lowest-low demand for spouse and children.  According to Atoh (1997), the 
individualistic attitude has increased only moderately in Japan.  Although attitudes 
toward gender relationship and care for elderly parents have changed considerably, 
those changes have not caused a decline in demand for spouse or children.  Thus, 
recent fertility decline should be explained not from demand itself but from obstacles 
to fulfilling the demand.    We will examine such obstacles in the following sections. 
 
  2-4. Direct Cost of Children 
  In the world of 
post-industrialization, 
globalization and rapid 
technological development, 
there is a growing demand 
for human capital 
investment.  Thus, parents 
are more interested in 
quality of children and 
educational cost becomes 
higher (Becker, 1981; Willis, 
1994).  The rising cost of 
children including public 
and private educational 
costs is thought to be the 
main reason of the recent 
low fertility in Japan.  For 
Japanese wives whose 
expected number of 
children was lower than the 
ideal number, the most 
frequent answer was “Too 
much money is needed for 
childbearing and education” 
(NIPSSR, 2003, p.60). 
  Figure 9 depicts the 
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change in the college enrollment rate in Japan since 1980.    Enrollment rose rapidly in 
the 1990s and was stagnated after 2000.  However, the shift from junior college to 
college is proceeding.  In Japan, the governmental support for tertiary education is 
smaller than in other developed countries and there are many private universities 
(Atoh and Akachi, 2003, p. 33; Moriizumi, 2005, p. 117).  The availability of 
scholarships is also limited.  For those reasons, Japanese parents are suffering from 
the financial cost of children more seriously than parents in other developed countries. 
  Human capital investments other than formal education are also increasing.  
Figure 10 shows the decline in the IMR (Infant Mortality Rate) in Japan since 1980.  
Though the pace of decline slowed down recently compared to the 1980s, the IMR in 
Japan is still decreasing.  The current level of 3 per thousand is among the lowest in 
the world.  Such an achievement cannot be made freely but both government and 
parents are paying for it.  There seems to be a trend of Japanese parents becoming 
more protective and spending more money on the health and education of their 
children.  
 
2-5. Economic Recession and Labor Market Condition 
  Young people that grew up in the period of rapid economic growth tend to have 
high aspirations for their future lives.  When the economy slows down, however, the 
labor market conditions for the young workers become tight.    Those who conceive the 
difficulty to achieve the expected standard of living will hesitate to step into marriage 
and childbearing (Easterlin, 1978; Yamada, 1999).     
  In the case of Japan, 
the economy was bad 
throughout the 1990s.    The 
unemployment rate rose 
sharply from 2% in 1990 to 
5% in 2003.  The tight 
labor market conditions 
seriously discouraged the 
career achievement of the 
youth.  Figure 11 shows 
the labor force status of 
college graduates 
immediately after 
graduation.  While those 
who obtained a stable job decreased from 77.8% in 1988 to 55.0% in 2003, those who 
obtained no job or a temporary job increased from 9.4% to 27.1% during the same 
period.  There was an improvement very recently and the proportions in 2005 were 
56.2% and 21.3%, respectively. 
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  According to Nagase (2002, pp. 27-28), part time work significantly reduces the 
hazard of first marriage for both men and women.  While the hazard rapidly rises 
between age 24 and 27 for women working on a fulltime basis, such acceleration cannot 
be observed for women with part time jobs.  Takayama and his coauthors (2000, pp. 
9-10) showed that the low income of young men relative to their fathers discouraged 
marriage.  In the past, the income of men in age 30s overcame that of their fathers 
and motivated women to marry them.    Recently, however, the relative income of young 
men to old men has declined considerably and young men are less attractive as 
marriage partners than before. 
  The poor economic 
performance in recent 
Japan has depressed not 
only nuptiality but also 
marital fertility.  The 
positive effect of the 
husband’s income on 
marital fertility has been 
identified repeatedly 
(Yamagami, 1999; Fujino, 
2002; Oyama, 2004).  In 
this connection, the wage 
index in The Monthly Labor 
Statistics Survey dropped 
by 6.7% points between 1997 and 2003.  The economic recession is thought to have 
affected not only through income level itself but also through the expected income in 
the future.  Figure 12 shows a result of an opinion survey conducted by the Cabinet 
Office asking expectation on one’s future life.  In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
there were more respondents who answered “(my life) will get better” than those who 
answered “will get worse”.  During the 1990s, however, the answer “worse” 
continuously increased and exceeded “better” around 1995.  In June, 2005, the 
pessimistic attitude surpassed the opportunistic one by 18 percentage points.  It is 
thought that such uncertainty about the future is one of the major sources of 
lowest-low fertility in recent Japan. 
 
2-6. Female Labor Force Participation and Gender Roles 
  According to Becker (1991, pp. 350-354), the main cause of family changes 
since the latter half of the 20th century was the rising economic power of women.    The 
expanding occupational opportunities for women increased the time spent on market 
activities and raised the opportunity cost of children.  The declining return from 
gender-based division of labor reduced the merit of marriage and promoted the rise in 
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the divorce rate.    These changes resulted in the increase in female-headed households, 
cohabitation, and extramarital births. 
  The theory predicts the negative impact of female labor force participation on 
fertility.  Actually, numerous empirical studies verified the negative effect of wife’s 
work on fertility at the micro level (Asami et al., 2000; Oi, 2004; Oyama, 2004; Sasai, 
1998; Shichijo and Nishimoto, 2003; Tsuya, 1999; Fukuda, 2004; Fujino 2002; Yashiro, 
2000; Yamagami, 1999; Yamaguchi, 2005).  At the macro level, however, the 
correlation between female labor and fertility among developed countries turned from 
negative to positive in the 1980s (Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 2005, pp. 2-3; Billari and 
Kohler, 2002, pp. 20-21; Atoh, 2000, p. 202).   
  In Japan, the 
incompatibility between 
female labor and fertility is 
expressed in an M-shaped 
curve of age-specific 
participation rates (Figure 
13).  Although an 
M-shaped curve can be seen 
also in Korea and New 
Zealand, the drop between 
age 25-29 and age 30-34 is 
steepest in Japan (Furugori, 
2003, p. 48).  Thus, many 
Japanese women have the 
ability and opportunity to work but they have to give up their career on childbearing.  
Such incompatibility is attributed to the remaining gender role attitude, low 
participation of the husband in housework, characteristics of the labor market, and 
underdevelopment of family friendly policy (Atoh and Akachi, 2003, p. 35; Meguro and 
Nishioka, 2000). 
  As far as gender equity in the domestic area is concerned, Japan is much lower 
than other developed countries.  Japanese husbands spend considerably shorter time 
on housework than US husbands (Tsuya and Bumpass, 2004) or Scandinavian 
husbands (Tsuya, 2003, p. 63).    The Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities by the 
Statistics Bureau shows that there was little change in husband’s participation in 
housework between 1981 and 1996 (Atoh, 2000, p. 205).    According to the proposition 
by McDonald (2000, p. 437) that “When gender equity rises to high levels in 
individual-oriented institutions while remaining low in family-oriented institutions, 
fertility will fall to very low levels”, Japan has a good reason to have very low fertility. 
 
3. Policy Interventions to Cope with Low Fertility 
Figure 13. Female Labor Force Participation










































































3-1. Governmental Actions in Japan 
  The Japanese government was surprised by the historically low TFR of 1.57 in 
1989 and started an inter-ministry meeting to invent measures to cope with the 
declining fertility in 1990.  The amount of child allowance was raised in 1991, while 
the period of payment was shortened to keep the budget.  The Childcare Leave Law 
(formally “Law Concerning the Welfare of Workers Who Take Care of Children or Other 
Family Members Including Child Care and Family Care Leave”) was established in 
May 1991 and enforced in April 1992.     In December 1994, the government publicized 
the Angel Plan for the period between 1994 and 1999.  The program emphasized the 
compatibility between work and childcare and public support of childrearing.  As a 
part of this program, amendments to the Childcare Leave Law were made to support 
income and exempt from payment of social security premium in 1994.  In 1997, a 
major reformation was made to the Child Welfare Law to provide with satisfactory 
daycare services for working mothers. 
  In December 1999, the Japanese government announced the New Angel Plan 
for the period between 1999 and 2004.  This document asserted the need to improve 
the gender equity and working condition.    In May 2000, amendments to the Childcare 
Leave Law and the Child Allowance Law determined that 40% of wage should be paid 
during the leave.  Child allowance was expanded from less than three years old 
defined in the 1991 revision to preschoolers.  The Next Generation Law, enacted in 
July 2003, required local governments and large companies to submit their own 
programs to foster new generations.    At the same time, the Law for Measures to Cope 
with Decreasing Children Society ordered the Cabinet Office to prepare new measures 
to prevent the rapid fertility decline.  An expansion of child allowance to the third 
grade of primary school was enforced in April 2004. 
  In December 2004, the Japanese government declared the Support Plan for 
Parents and Children (New-New Angel Plan) for the period between 2004 and 2009.  
The document emphasized the role of local government and companies in providing 
with childcare supports and improving gender equity.  In addition, the document 
pointed out the importance of economic independence of the youth.  From the fiscal 
year of 2006, the child allowance was expanded until the sixth grade of the primary 
school.  In addition, the Support Plan for Mothers’ Reentry to Labor Market started.  
The plan includes such measures as starting a course for reentering mothers at 
vocational schools, helping a mother who attempts to start business, and running 
“Mothers’ Hello Works” for job seeking mothers. 
  In June, 2006, the government announced the New Policy to Cope with Low 
Fertility, including additional cash benefit for the first three years after birth, 
improving payment procedure of one time cash benefit at birth, supporting the cost of 
medical check during pregnancy, establishing “Family Day” and “Family Week,” etc.   13
The additional cash benefit for young children was approved and will start from the 
fiscal year 2007.  In addition, the Ministry of Health plans to increase the cash 
benefit during the childcare leave from 40% to 50% of the wage. 
 
3-2. Child Allowance 
  The child allowance of Japan started in 1971.  Since 1992, 5,000 yen per 
month for the first and second children and 10,000 yen for the third and subsequent 
children have been paid.  Until May 2000, only children less than three years were 
eligible.  Between June 2000 and March 2004, the target was widened to include all 
preschoolers.  In April 2004, the age limit was raised to the third year of primary 
school.  In April 2006, the limit was raised further to include all primary school 
students aged 12 years and less.  Japan’s child allowance is means tested.  In 
February 2003, 6,880,786 children were receiving child allowance (NIPSSR, 2005, p. 
170).  This was about 85% of the preschooler population.  Thus, about 15% of 
children were eliminated because of high income of their parents. 
  The effect of child allowance is evaluated by regarding it to be additional 
income of husband.  Since the income of wife has both income effect and opportunity 
effect, the child allowance should not be seen a part of it.  Table 1 shows results of 
three papers.    The effect of husband’s income was statistically significant at 10% level 
in Yamagami and Morita, and at 1% level in Oyama.  Yamagami’s fertility function 
shows that a rise in husband income by 10 thousand yen per year would raise the 
number of children by 0.00244.  Oyama’s analysis shows that an increase of 10 
thousand yen per month would elevate the number of children by 0.01.    Morita’s OLS 
result implies that the elasticity of fertility to husband income is 0.043.     
 
Table 1. Effectiveness of Child Allowance
Yamagami Oyama Morita
(1999) (2004) (2006)






Partial regression coefficient 0.00244 0.01 0.043
Child allowance required to
raise the number of children by





  However, these income effects are so small that very high allowance is 
required to produce a visible effect.  The table also shows the amount of child 
allowance that is necessary to raise the number of children by 0.1.  If Morita’s 
elasticity were correct, no economic support policy could make a significant effect on  14
fertility.    Even if we rely on Yamagami’s coefficient, the child allowance of 34,000 yen 
per month must be paid to raise the TFR by 0.1.    In Sweden, 950 krona (15,000 yen) is 
paid per month per child under 16 years old (METI, 2005).  Thus, the required 
amount is more than twice as much as Sweden that is famous for very generous family 
allowance. 
 
3-3. Childcare Leave 
  The childcare leave was approved in the Diet of Japan in May 1991 and 
enforced in April 1992.    Although the law allowed a female worker or her husband to 
leave until the first birth day of their child, there was no cash benefit at that time.  
The amendments in June 1994 legalized a cash benefit of 25% of wage and exemption 
from social security premiums during the leave.  These revisions were enforced in 
April 1995.  The amendment in November 2001 raised the cash benefit to 40% and 
was enforced in April 2002.  Under the current system, 30% is paid monthly during 
the leave and 10% is paid after returning to work.  Although the leave is basically 
allowed until the first birthday of a child, public servants can leave until the third 
birthday.  Other workers can prolong the leave for six months if a daycare center is 
not available.    However, no cash benefit is paid in either case for the prolonged period. 
  According to the Basic Survey of Employment Management of Women in 2003, 
73.1% of female workers who gave birth in fiscal year 2002 took childcare leave.  
However, many women retire from work before childbearing and are not included in 
the denominator (Atoh, 2005, p. 46).  A female worker who was not continuously 
employed for a year or who does not plan to come back to her job is also excluded.  
There were 103,478 cases that received cash benefit during childcare leave in 2003 
(NIPSSR, 2005, p. 381).    This was only 9.2% of the number of annual births. 
 








(2002) (2003) (2005) (2003)




Fertility without leave (f 0) 0.0368 0.0364 0.0362 0.0361
Fertility with leave (f 1) 0.0376 0.0411 0.0434 0.0447
Proportin of leave takers (p) 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092





  There are several studies that evaluate the effect of childcare leave on fertility 
in Japan.  Table 2 shows partial regression coefficients in four studies.  Since each 
coefficient b is supposed to show a log-odds ratio of fertility between a female who can  15
take childcare leave and one who cannot, exp(b) gives a odds ratio.  Because Shigeno 
and Matsuura (2003) and Yamaguchi (2005) analyzed fertility of a five-year period, 
exp(b/5) is shown in the table.    While Suruga and Nishimoto (2002) used Basic Survey 
of Employment Management of Women by the former Ministry of Labour, other three 
studies used Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers by the Institute for Research on 
Household Economic.  Thus, the difference in magnitude seems to come from the 
difference in data source. 
  If we express the average fertility rate of a female who cannot take childcare 















  If the proportion of women who can take childcare leave is expressed as p, then 
the TFR can be written as follows. 
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  The multiplier 35 comes from the length of reproductive period.  The 
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  Though the expression is a little messy, it is possible to determine the value of 
f0 if one gives an adequate value for each parameter.  In Table 2, TFR=1.29 and p 
=0.092 were applied.    Once the values of f0 and f1 are determined, we can simulate the 
effect of rise in p, the proportion of women who take childcare leave.    The hypothetical 
proportion that is required to raise the TFR by 0.1 is shown in Table 2.    If the reality 
is close to the analysis by Suruga and Nishimoto, it is impossible to elevate the TFR by 
0.1 with the use of childcare leave.  Even if we rely on other three studies, an 
extremely impressive improvement from 9% to more than 40% is required.  It would 
be difficult to make such an advance within a decade. 
 
3-4. Childcare Service 
  The compatibility between female work and childrearing has been the primary 
political goal of the Japanese government.  The Angel Plan announced in 1994 had 
“support for simultaneous child rearing and work” at the top of its list.    In accordance 
to this guideline, a major revision was made to the Child Welfare Law in 1997 and 
public daycare service shifted from the municipality assignment system  16
(administrative measures) to a system to allow parents to select their preferred 
daycare center.    The New Angel Plan in 1999 sustained the emphasis on compatibility.   
The New-New Angel Plan in 2004 also contained a chapter on “Compatibility between 
Work and Family and Reconsideration of Work Customs.”    However, childcare service 
was discussed in other chapter entitled “Renewed Support and Solidarity for 
Childcare.”  The chapter contained various issues such as reinforcing local childcare 
centers, supporting a variety of childcare services, assisting volunteer activities on 
childcare, expanding public daycare services, running after-school clubs at primary 
schools, etc. 
  The cabinet of Japan adopted “Zero Waiting List for Daycare Program” as a 
political goal in July 2001.  The governmental effort was partially successful at least 
in very recent years.  According to the Children and Families Bureau, the number of 
children on the waiting list decreased from 26,383 in 2003 to 23,338 in 2005.    However, 
daycare service is still less available in Japan for very early childhood.    Of the 23,338 
children on the waiting list, 15,831 (67.8%) were under two years old.  This accounts 
for 0.47% of the population under age two. 
  There were 632,011 children under age two (18.6% of the population) in 
daycare center in April 2005.  Since the proportion was 13.4% in 1998, there was an 
increase by 5.2 percentage points by 2005.  However, such an improvement in 
childcare service does not seem to have contributed to fertility in Japan. 
  The simplest measure of compatibility between wife’s work and childbearing 
would be the proportion of working mothers among all wives.    This measure is the key 
to understanding the micro-macro paradox of the relationship between fertility and 
female labor force participation.  Let g be the proportion of working mothers, m be 
that of all mothers, and w be that of all workers.    Then, a two by two contingency table 
can be written as follows; 
 
 Not  Mother  Mother   
Not Worker  1 – w – m + g  m – g 1  –  w 
Worker  w – g  g w 
  1 – m  m  1 
 
  For all four cells to be positive, the following condition is necessary in addition 
to 0 < g < m and 0 < g < w. 
 
1 – w – m + g > 0. 
 
  For the work status of a wife and presence of a child to be negatively correlated, 
g must be smaller than the expected value of the independence model. 
  17
g < w m. 
 
  If we coordinate the proportion of workers (w) on the horizontal axis and that 
of mothers (m) on the vertical axis, the area enclosed by a straight line and a hyperbola 
simultaneously satisfies two conditions above.    Figure 14 shows such areas for g = 0.2, 
0.4 and 0.6.  If we consider g to be a measure of compatibility, the area moves in the 
upper-right direction as the compatibility is improved.  Thus, the paradoxical 
situation can be understood as a result of an increasing compatibility.  When wife’s 
work and childrearing was less compatible, all the countries were located at lower-left 
region of the graph.  However, some countries succeeded in improving the 
compatibility and moved to upper-right direction.    In this way, the positive correlation 




















































  One implication of Figure 14 
is that the higher the compatibility, 
the narrower the area in which the 
micro-macro paradox holds.  Then, 
it is expected that a country with 
high compatibility may easily escape 
from the area and the micro level 
correlation may turn to be positive.  
This expectation is materialized in 
Sweden where recent micro level analyses showed the positive impact of women’s 
works on fertility (Hoorens, et al., 2005, pp. 226-227).  However, Figure 14 suggests 
Table 3. Labor Force Participation and Motherhood
         of Married Women Aged 30-34 (%)
1997 Not Mother Mother
Not Worker 9.6 47.1
Worker 11.9 31.4
2004 Not Mother Mother
Not Worker 8.2 48.7
Worker 12.9 30.2
MIC, Employment Status Surveys. 18
that in a country with low compatibility such as Japan, there is a wide room of fertility 
decline. 
  Table 3 shows contingency tables of work status and the presence of a child of 
married women aged 30-34.    This age group is the bottom of the M-shaped labor force 
participation pattern (see Figure 13), implying the compatibility is most crucial.  In 
Japan, the governmental policy failed to increase the proportion of working mothers 
and the increase in labor participation resulted in fertility decline. 
  Some analyses of micro data in Japan identified the effect of childcare services 
on the work status of wives.    For example, Oishi (2003) found that the cost of daycare 
service has negative impact on a wife’s labor force participation.  However, recent 
multivariate analyses did not identify a significant effect of childcare service on 
fertility.    Shigeno and Ohkusa (1999) included such indices as waiting list for daycare 
service, availability of infant care and night-time care into their model but none of 
them had significant effect on recent birth.  Shigeno and Matsuura (2003) included 
respondent’s substantive evaluation for local childcare service into their fertility 
function but its t value was 1.19.    One statistically significant result was obtained but 
it was bivariate analysis and was not a net effect (Shigeno, 2006, p. 109).    Thus, even 
if there is a net effect of governmental effort for childcare service, its magnitude is too 
small to be verified clearly. 
 
4. Low Fertility and Policy Intervention in Comparative Perspective 
 
4-1. Spread of Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe and Asia 
  Lowest-low fertility appeared in Europe during the 1990s causing a drastic 
change in the demographic map of the region.  The second demographic transition 
theory (van de Kaa, 1987) described the novelty of Western and Northern European 
countries in terms of below replacement fertility and emergence of postmodern 
behaviors such as cohabitation and extramarital births.  However, while these 
forerunners stayed at moderately low fertility, latecomers showed unexpected declines 
to lowest-low fertility.  This change caused not only a reverse in the geographic 
pattern of European fertility but also that in the correlation with fertility of the total 
first marriage rate, the proportion of extramarital births, and the female labor force 
participation rate (Kohler et al., 2002, pp. 643-644). 
  Table 5 lists up the countries having lowest-low fertility since 2000.  While 
Kohler and his coauthors (2002) listed 14 countries in 1999, there are 20 countries on 
this new list.  Small countries and areas such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Luxemburg, 
Andorra, and San Marino were excluded.  Korea arrived at the threshold of 1.3 in 
2001, followed by Japan and Taiwan in 2003.    Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Lithuania joined the group after 2000.  On the other hand, Estonia, 
Armenia and Russia escaped from lowest-low fertility.    Belarus was excluded from the  19
table because of the lack of recent data. 
 
Table 4. Lowest-Low Fertility after 2000
Region Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Eastern Asia Japan 1.36 1.33 1.32 1.29 1.29 1.25
Republic of Korea 1.47 1.30 1.17 1.19 1.16 1.05
Taiwan 1.68 1.40 1.34 1.24 1.18 1.12
Southern Europe Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.28 1.44 1.23
Greece 1.27 1.25 1.27
Italy 1.24 1.23 1.26 1.29
Slovenia 1.26 1.21 1.21 1.20
Spain 1.24 1.26 1.27 1.30
Eastern Europe Bulgaria 1.30 1.24 1.21 1.23
Czech Republic 1.14 1.14 1.17 1.18
Hungary 1.32 1.31 1.30 1.28
Poland 1.34 1.29 1.24 1.22
Romania 1.31 1.27 1.26 1.27
Slovak Republic 1.30 1.20 1.19 1.20
Former USSR Armenia 1.11 1.02 1.21 1.35
Latvia 1.24 1.21 1.24 1.29
Lithuania 1.39 1.30 1.24 1.26
Moldova 1.30 1.25 1.21 1.22
Russian Federation 1.21 1.25 1.32 1.32
Ukraine 1.09 1.13 1.17
(Source)     Japan:  Statistics and Information Dpt, MHLW
Korea:  Korea National Statisitics Office
Taiwan:  Taiwan Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics
Europe:  Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Development in Europe 2003&2004  
 
4-2. Effectiveness of Pronatal Policy 
 There  is 
considerable evidence that 
the pronatal policy has 
some effects.  Cases 
frequently referred to 
include France after the 
Second World War, German 
state of Saar under French 
rule, Eastern European 
socialist countries until the 
1970s, and Sweden around 
1990 (Chesnais, 1998, pp. 
98-99; Atoh, 2000, pp. 
198-199; Caldwell et al., 
2002, p. 18).    Besides these historical cases, abundant quantitative analyses of micro 
data have proved the effectiveness of various policy measures (Kojima, 1989; 2003).  
Thus, it is widely accepted that the effect of pronatal policy is not zero.    However, the 
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critical question here should be “Can Japan achieve moderately low fertility with 
policy interventions?”.  It seems to be very difficult to narrow the difference between 
Japan and moderately low fertility countries in Western and Northern Europe and 
English speaking developed countries, considering the small elasticity of fertility to 
policy measures. 
  Even if policy intervention is successful, its effect is not necessarily lasting.  
Figure 15 displays the trajectory of the TFR in Singapore.    In March 1987, Singapore 
started a new population policy.  Under the slogan of "Have three or more, if you can 
afford it", such pronatal measures were enforced as tax relief for the third and 
subsequent children, subsidization of daycare cost, and housing privilege for a large 
family (Sasai, 2005, pp. 466-467).  As a result, the TFR jumped from 1.43 in 1986 to 
1.96 in 1988.    However, the TFR started declining again from 1989, though it took 15 
years to drop to the level of 1986.   
 
4-3. Cultural Deterministic View on Fertility 
  France is famous for 
its long history of pronatal 
policy intervention.  The 
Family Code that imposed 
family allowances was 
enacted as early as in 1939 
and was integrated to social 
security system in 1945 
(Kojima, 1996, p. 157; 
Caldwell et al., 2002, p. 8).  
In the background, there was 
an anxiety on French fertility 
that was lower than England 
throughout the 19th century 
(Chesnais, 1998, p. 92).  On 
the contrary to France, the United Kingdom is famous as a country without pronatal 
policy (Hiraoka, 1996, p. 131; Atoh, 2000, p. 200; Kamano, 2003, p. 54).  Parental 
leave is 26 weeks and no cash benefit is given (Fukuda, 2003, p. 12), which is less 
generous than Japan.    Governmental effort for childcare service is low and non-profit 
organizations play a major role.  Child allowance is lower for the second and higher 
order children (Neyer, 2002, pp. 62-67).  In spite of this opposing policy orientation, 
TFRs in France and the United Kingdom showed a very similar trajectory.  As 
depicted in Figure 15, it is only since 1998 that France has consistently overcome the 
United Kingdom in fertility.   
  Weak explanatory power of policy intervention becomes clearer if we include 
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another English speaking country.  The United States is even more indifferent to 
family policy than the United Kingdom.  There is no child allowance system.  
Parental leave is untouched to be 12 weeks without cash benefit (Kamano, 2003, p. 55).   
Despite the lack of governmental effort, TFR of the United States has been 
considerably higher than France since the mid 1980s.  Thus, there must be some 
socio-cultural characteristics in Anglo-Saxon countries that keep fertility higher than 
France.  The distinctive feature of age pattern of fertility in English-speaking 
countries (Chandola et al., 2002) seems to support such an inference. 
  There is a cultural divide between moderately low fertility and lowest-low or 
very low fertility.  As suggested in Table 4, all Western and Northern European 
countries and English-speaking countries have successfully avoided lowest-low 
fertility.    McDonald (2005) chose the line of 1.5 to divide moderately low fertility and 
very low fertility.  In his cultural divide, all Nordic countries, all English-speaking 
countries, and all French and Dutch speaking Western European countries have TFR 
of 1.5 or higher.    The countries with very low fertility are all advanced Eastern Asian 
countries, all Southern European countries and all German-speaking Western 
European countries.  While emphasizing the role of policy intervention, McDonald 
suggested that this divide has deep historical roots and is difficult to change.  Atoh 
(2005, pp. 51-52) pointed out the influence of traditional values as one of factors 
beyond family policy. 
  When lowest-low fertility was a phenomenon within Europe, it was natural to 
look for features common in lowest-low fertility countries.  However, once lowest-low 
fertility has spread out from Europe, the appropriateness of this attempt is 
questionable.  Because lowest-low fertility has appeared in very different cultural 
settings in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia, the phenomenon 
seems to be a natural response to socioeconomic changes in the postmaterial era.  In 
this respect, those countries that have avoided lowest-low fertility should be seen as 
exceptional and requiring explanation.    This section expands the discussion in Suzuki 
(2003a) and examines cultural determinants of moderately low fertility in Western and 
Northern Europe and advanced English-speaking countries. 
  Reher (1998) asserted that the contrast between weak family ties in Western 
and Northern Europe and strong family ties in Southern Europe has deep historical 
roots.  In contrast to the Oriental family system that affected Southern Europe, the 
“Occidental” structure was based on the conjugal pair and women’s position was high 
in the northern part of the continent.  The Reformation changed the meaning of 
marriage from a sacrament to a civil contract, enhanced women’s position further, 
lowered parental authority, and promoted individualism (Reher, 1998, pp. 213-214).  
Thus, gender equity and compatibility between wife’s work and childcare in today’s 
moderately low fertility countries have long historical background.    This is why these 
countries developed non-parental childcare activities by baby sitters, tutors, childcare  22
workers and other professionals.  In contrast, countries with strong family ties are 
still clinging to maternal cares.  According to the Third National Family Survey in 
2003 (NIPSSR), 82.9% of Japanese wives agreed that “A mother should not work but 
take care of her child for three years after the birth”.   Such an emphasis on mother’s 
supreme role could be the factor that intercepts the effect of childcare service on 
fertility. 
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  Another prominent feature of Western-Northern Europe and its descendents is 
early home-leaving.  In these countries in the pre-industrial era, young men and 
women left the parental home before marriage to work as servants (Reher, 1998; Wall, 
1999).    The tradition of the majority of men and women leaving home before marriage 
still remains today (Billari et al., 2001, pp. 18-19).  Premarital home-leaving is 
supposed to promote union formation through both consensual union and formal 
marriage, while Southern European adolescents are suffering from postponement 
syndrome, which discourages autonomy and decision making ability in their own lives 
(Dalla Zuanna, 2001; Livi-Bacci, 2001).  As shown in Figure 16, Japan occupies a 
singular position in that men leave as early as Northern Europeans while women leave 
as late as Southern Europeans.    However, since late leaving of either sex discourages 
union formation, Japan may suffer from the same problem as Southern Europeans.  23
  Last but not least, 
a clear cultural divide in 
cohabitation and 
extramarital birth has 
been observed.  These 
postmodern behaviors 
were once related to the 
fertility decline to below 
replacement level.   
Today, however, the low 
frequency of such 
behaviors is a good 
predictor of lowest-low 
fertility.  Japan is 
characterized by very 
robust marriage institution.  As shown in Figure 18, the proportion of extramarital 
births in Japan has been extremely low even compared with lowest-low fertility 
countries in Southern Europe.  The proportion in 2004 was 1.99%, which hardly 
changed from 0.80% in 1980.    As long as the Japanese people cling to reproduction via 
marriage, it would be difficult to avoid postponement syndrome, cease overprotecting 




  Japan has been adopting and extending policy measures to cope with low 
fertility.  However, those efforts have not been successful in preventing fertility 
decline.    Quantitative analyses have shown that the effects of policy interventions are 
weak.  Thus, a large part of the difference from moderately low fertility should be 
attributed to direct effects of cultural features, not to governmental efforts.  This 
might apply to Korea and Taiwan.  It is just a fantasy that TFR would come back to 
moderately low level if Eastern Asian countries adopted policy interventions used in 
Western and Northern Europe.    Although gender equity is a widely accepted political 
goal, it would be difficult to catch up Western-Northern Europe that has long historical 
background.    It is questionable if a consensus can be made that a government should 
promote early home-leaving of young people.  A government definitely should not 
induce extramarital births by increasing the number of welfare mothers.  Then, 
continuous fertility recovery would be impossible without a significant change in work 
and family behaviors.  Although there is a sign of assimilation to Western-Northern 
weak family pattern in Southern Europe, such a change would be more difficult to take 
place in Eastern Asia.    Changes toward the compatibility and family-friendliness will 
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continue but it will take long time to for Asian countries to catch up European 
countries.  Then, it would be possible that lowest-low fertility in Eastern Asia lasts 
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  Japan’s TFR in 2005 was 1.26, which was “lowest-low” fertility defined to have 
TFR of 1.3 or less.    It seems to be impossible for cohorts born after 1960 to achieve the 
complete fertility of its predecessors.    The delay in childbearing was accelerated again 
after 2000.    It was shown that both nuptiality and marital fertility contributed to the 
recent fertility decline.  Since demands for spouse and children are not at the 
lowest-low level, recent fertility decline should be explained from obstacles to fulfill 
the demand.    Firstly, the increase in direct cost of children is attributable to growing 
human investments on education and health of children.  Secondly, the economic 
recession hindered young people’s economic independence and propensity to marry.  
Married couples were also psychologically depressed with uncertainty toward the 
future and avoided to have children.  Finally, under the low compatibility between 
women’s work and childrearing, the growth in female labor force participation had a 
negative impact on fertility. 
  The Japanese government has been adopting pronatal measures since the 
early 1990s but has not succeeded in preventing fertility decline    Measures applied by 
the government include expansion of child allowance, introduction of childcare leave, 
improvement in childcare services, subsidization of medical treatment for infecundity, 
etc.  However, pronatal measures are not as effective as expected.  Quantitative 
analyses show that it is very difficult to elevate TFR by 0.1 with policy interventions.  
A cultural deterministic view on fertility asserts that a large part of the difference 
between moderately low and lowest-low fertility are attributable to direct effects of 
cultural features.  It is thought that such cultural patterns as weak family ties, 
traditionally high position of women, early independence of children, and high 
prevalence of cohabitation and extramarital births have prevented fertility in Western 
and Northern Europe from falling to the lowest-low level.  Since some cultural 
differences are beyond the governmental policy and changes are slow, Eastern Asian 
countries will stay long at the considerably low fertility level than European countries. 